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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010060-CA 
Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Contrary to the State's contention, Appellant Jeffery Ray Chatwin's conviction 
cannot be affirmed because the prosecutor admitted that he used a peremptory strike to 
remove Venireman Amador Romero on the basis of his sex. R. 101 [27]. Fruitlessly, the 
State attempts to minimize the prosecutor's admission with two arguments: 1) the 
admission is inconsequential because Mr. Chatwin failed to make a prima facie showing 
of discrimination beforehand; and 2) the prosecutor dismissed Mr. Romero in an attempt 
to impanel a gender-balanced jury, not to discredit men as a class. Appellee's Br. 4-5. 
Neither argument works. 
The State's first argument requires this Court to focus on prima facie 
considerations and overlook the prosecutor's bald statements that he removed Mr. 
Romero from the jury "because he was a man" and the game plan was to remove men. R. 
101 [27]. This is nonsensical. With blatant discrimination on record, prima facie 
considerations are insignificant and cannot justify an affirmance. 
At any rate, the prima facie showing was sufficient. A review of the record shows 
that Mr. Romero's dismissal was suspicious. To begin with, he was the only member of a 
racial minority group on the venire, R. 101 [26], and he spoke with an accent. Id at 28. 
Further, there was no apparent reason for his dismissal. He was neither incompetent nor 
undesirable from the standpoint of the prosecutor. R. 101 [7, 25-28]; Aplt. Br. 15-17. 
Finally, the prosecutor used one hundred percent of his strikes to remove men from the 
jury, R. 49, and he effectively impaneled a predominantly female jury. 14 In these 
circumstances, suspicion of either racial or sexual discrimination was justified. And so, 
the State's prima facie argument fails. 
The State's second argument is that the prosecutor's act of discrimination was 
pardonable because he was merely trying to impanel a gender-balanced jury. But the 
record does not bear this out. The record shows he blatantly discriminated against men, 
R. 101 [27], and it even shows that he was more comfortable with women on the jury 
than men. Id. The prosecutor was not merely trying to impanel a gender-balanced jury, he 
was illegally discriminating against men and the trial court should have belayed the 
strike. 
Most importantly, the State's argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the United States Supreme Court case of J.E.B. v. Alabama. J.E.B. prohibits sexual 
discrimination during jury selection, and there are no exceptions. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 
U.S. 127, 129 (1994). There is certainly no exception for prosecutors who attempt to 
impanel gender-balanced juries. This is because doing so requires the prosecutor to focus 
2 
exclusively on gender and then remove venire persons on that basis. This is precisely 
what is prohibited. Id. What is more, the prosecutor cannot justify his actions by arguing 
that impaneling a gender-balanced jury is a finer goal than that of complying with J.E.B. 
Like anyone else, the prosecutor is subject to the law and cannot violate it for his own 
purposes, whatever they may be. 
In sum, Mr. Chatwin's conviction cannot be affirmed. The prosecutor admitted 
sexual discrimination, and commented that he was more comfortable with women on the 
jury than with Mr. Romero on the jury. R. 101 [27]. This shows that the jury selection 
proceeding was irreparably tainted by at least one Equal Protection violation, and this 
case must be remanded for a fresh trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS DO NOT ALLAY THE EFFECTS 
OF THE PROSECUTOR'S BLATANT SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION 
Mr. Chatwin's conviction should be reversed and this case remanded for a new 
trial because the jury selection proceeding was tainted with illegal sexual discrimination. 
During the proceeding, the prosecutor used a preemptive strike to remove Mr. Romero 
from the venire "because he was a man" and the prosecutor's game plan was to remove 
men. R. 101 [27]. Under Batson v. Kentucky this discrimination violates the Equal 
Protection provision of the federal constitution and compels retrial. Batson v. Kentucky. 
476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986). 
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Nothing the State argues justifies an affirmance in these circumstances. Without 
exception, blatant sexual discrimination is unjustifiable and the taint of sexual 
discrimination cannot be removed once it is permitted to infiltrate the jury selection 
proceeding.1 Nonetheless, the State makes two basic arguments: 1) Mr. Chatwin failed to 
make a prima facie showing of illegal discrimination, and 2) the prosecutor's goal of 
impaneling a gender-balanced jury was in harmony with J.E.B. Appellee's Br. 4-5. The 
first argument is unsupportable, and the second misunderstands J.E.B and its 
jurisprudence. These arguments are examined in order below. 
A. Prima Facie Considerations Cannot Remove the Taint of Illegal Sexual 
Discrimination 
The State's prima facie argument focuses on procedural protocol. Appellee's Br. 
11. According to protocol, the defense counsel must make a prima facie showing of 
illegal discrimination before the prosecutor must explain the peremptory strike at issue.2 
The State asserts that the prima facie showing in this case was insufficient and justifies an 
affirmance. Appellee's Br. 13. 
This argument is unsupportable. Semantical interests aside, the prosecutor's 
admission of sexual discrimination compels reversal and retrial regardless of prima facie 
'Batson. 476 U.S. at 97-98; J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994); State v. 
Litherland. 2000 UT 76,1[23 n.9,12 P.3d 92; State v. Colwell. 2000 UT 8,1fl4, 994 P.2d 177; 
State v. Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305,1(28,989 P.2d 503. 
2
 J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 144; ColwelL 2000 UT 8,1fl7; State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518 
(Utah 1989). 
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considerations. In fact, a majority of federal and state courts hold that the prima facie 
issue is moot once the prosecutor gives an explanation for the peremptory challenge at 
issue, the arguments are made, and the court decides the issue.3 At this point, the 
principal question is not whether the prima facie showing was sufficient, but whether the 
defense met its ultimate burden of proving that the prosecutor illegally discriminated 
against a venire person.4 This is because the ultimate burden transcends the preliminary 
burden of a prima facie showing, and makes it inconsequential on appeal.5 
3
 Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 352,359 (1991); United States v. Sneed. 34 F.3d 
1570,1579 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson. 941 F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991); 
Rankins v. Carev. 141 F. Supp.2d 1231,1236 (D.C. Cal. 2001); People v. Rivera. 719 N.E.2d 
154, 162 (111. App. Ct. 1999); State v. Edwards. 955 P.2d 1276, 1288 (Kan. 1998); Collins v. 
State. 691 So.2d 918, 925 (Miss. 1997); Fritz v. State. 946 S.W.2d 844, 850 n.2 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1997); Colwell. 2000 UT 8,1J18; State v. Higginbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996); 
State v. King. 572 N.W.2d 530, 533 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). 
4
 See State v. Cannon. 2002 UT App 18, f5,41 P.3d 1153 (A trial court's determination 
that the opponent of a peremptory challenge has failed to prove purposeful racial discrimination 
will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous); Higginbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 
1996) (The trial court's decision of "whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge has 
proved purposeful racial discrimination . . . will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.") 
(citations omitted). 
5
 An examination of the respective burdens of the parties is helpful in understanding this. 
These burdens are set out in the three-part Batson test. Initially, the defense counsel has the 
burden of making a prima facie showing of illegal discrimination. This is a threshold showing, 
and can be met by proffering a variety of evidence and argument relating to the voir dire and 
jury selection. J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 144-45; Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305,1J29. Then the burden 
shifts to the prosecutor to proffer a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge at 
issue. Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518. Finally, if the explanation is race or gender-neutral, the trial court 
must decide whether the defense counsel has proved purposeful discrimination. State v. Pharris. 
846 P.2d 454,464 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
As is apparent from this review, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the defense 
counsel and never relents. See State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
('°[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts 
from, the opponent of the strike.'") (citations omitted). Although the burden of persuasion 
5 
This case helps illustrate the nonsensical results that would result if prima facie 
considerations are allowed to supercede the overall results of a Batson inquiry. Here, the 
prosecutor admitted that his game plan was to remove men from the jury. R. 101 [27]. He 
also explained that he removed Mr. Romero because he was a man. Id. If these 
admissions are ignored and the focus turns instead to preliminary matters, minor points 
such as the racial demographics of the venire or the presence of a linguistic accent will 
overshadow the blatant illegal discrimination on record. This cannot be allowed. While a 
prima facie showing is procedurally important at trial, it is insignificant in this case 
because a Batson inquiry was completed and blatant illegal discrimination is apparent. 
What is more, reversal and retrial is necessary in this case even if the defense 
counsel's prima facie showing of illegal discrimination is thoroughly examined and 
critiqued. The trial court declared it sufficient, R. 101 [27], and that court is in the best 
position to make the necessary observations, ask the necessary questions, and assess the 
sufficiency of a showing.6 In this case, the trial court observed voir dire, observed the 
attorneys during voir dire, observed Mr. Romero, and witnessed the pattern of 
temporarily shifts to the prosecutor to give a race or gender-neutral explanation for a peremptory 
challenge, the defense counsel is never relieved of the ultimate burden of persuasion. Thus, the 
ultimate burden transcends the prima facie case, and it becomes inconsequential once a Batson 
inquiry is completed. 
6
 See State v. Bourgeois, 786 So.2d 771, 776 (La. Ct. App. 2001) ("The trial judge 
observes first-hand the demeanor of the attorneys and venire persons, the nuances of questions 
asked, the . . . composition of the venire, and the general atmosphere of the voir dire that simply 
cannot be replicated from a cold record. Thus, when a Batson challenge is made, it is incumbent 
upon the trial judge to address the challenge, either by ruling on whether a prima facie case of 
discriminatory intent has been made or by requiring race neutral reasons for the strikes.") 
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preliminary strikes made by each attorney. R. 101 [24-28]. On these bases, the trial court 
properly found a prima facie case of illegal discrimination. R. 101 [27]. 
Nevertheless, the State argues that the defense counsel did not make a sufficient 
showing of illegal discrimination. Specifically, the State argues that: 1) the record does 
not show that the Mr. Romero is a member of a racial minority group; 2) Mr. Romero's 
minority status does not, by itself, establish a prima facie case; 3) the defense counsel did 
not establish a pattern of strikes against minority jurors; and 4) the defense counsel 
himself applied a racial stereotype. Appellee's Br. 11-13. All of these lack merit. 
First, the record fully supports that Mr. Romero is a member of a racial minority 
group. During voir dire the trial court had ample opportunity to observe Mr. Romero and 
listen to him speak. R. 101 [7]. The court did not question his racial minority status; in 
fact, the trial court found that he is a member of a racial minority group and noted that he 
has a Hispanic surname. R. 101 [27]. Further, the defense counsel observed on the record 
that Mr. Romero has "a little bit of an accent," and this was not disputed by either the 
prosecutor or the court. R. 101 [28]. Even the prosecutor observed that the trial court 
"could find that" Mr. Romero was a member of a racial minority group. R. 101 [26]. 
There is no basis for the State's argument that Mr. Romero is not a member of a racial 
minority group. 
Second, the State correctly points out that a venire person's minority status, by 
itself, does not establish a prima facie case.7 However, the prima facie case is well-
7
 Cannon. 2002 UT App 18, % 
1 
supported by a variety of points. Significantly, Mr. Romero was the only racial minority 
member on the venire and his dismissal appears unwarranted. R. 49-50, 101 [26]. Mr. 
Romero spoke only once during voir dire, and merely stated that he works for Associated 
Food Stores and his wife works for Sky West. R. 101 [7]. He did not indicate 
employment in the legal field, involvement with the criminal justice system, or anything 
else that would make him undesirable to the prosecutor. Also, as fully set out in the 
opening brief, there was nothing to indicate that he was in any way incompetent. Aplt. 
Br. 15-17. In these circumstances, the trial court was well-justified in finding a prima 
facie case of illegal discrimination. 
Third, the State's complaint that the defense counsel failed to show that the 
prosecutor systematically excluded racial minorities from the jury is meritless. As a 
practical matter, making this showing is impossible when there is only one minority 
venire person, as there was here. R. 49-50,101 [26]. Also, showing a pattern of strikes 
against minorities is only one way to support a prima facie case. There are many other 
ways and the absence of a pattern is not fatal.8 At any rate, the prosecutor's pattern of 
strikes supports the defense counsel's prima facie case. The prosecutor dismissed the sole 
minority venire person, and used one hundred percent of his strikes to dismiss men. R. 
8
 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Notably, if a pattern of strikes was required, racial 
discrimination would be implicitly condoned any time only one member of a racial minority 
group appears in the venire. This result would directly conflict with both Batson and J.EJEL 
which recognized that "[t]he exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that 
juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 
n.13. 
8 
49. That is as significant, or more significant, in establishing a prima facie case than 
many other conceivable patterns of strikes. It supports the defense counsel's prima facie 
argument that the prosecutor illegally discriminated against Mr. Romero. R. 101 [25-26]. 
It even shows that all four strikes by the prosecutor were potentially gender-based. 
Finally, contrary to the State's argument, the defense counsel did not demonstrate 
bigotry. He merely speculated that Mr. Romero may sympathize with Mr. Chatwin's 
poverty. This speculation could have been based upon the defense counsel's observations 
of Mr. Romero during voir dire, R. 101 [7], his explanation that he worked for a grocery 
store chain, Id, or some other factor not readily attainable from the record. The 
assumption that the defense counsel's speculation was based upon his race is 
unwarranted. Furthermore, whether any racism could be implied from the defense 
counsel's comments is irrelevant because he did not effectuate any illegal discrimination 
during the jury selection. That is an error which the prosecutor made and it should be 
corrected by a reversal and retrial. 
The trial court's finding of a prima facie case of illegal discrimination is fully 
supported by the record, R. 101 [7, 26-29], and the State's arguments of insufficiency 
fail. Most importantly, prima facie considerations cannot obviate the taint of illegal 
sexual discrimination. The prosecutor admitted illegal discrimination against Mr. 
Romero, R. 101 [27], and this discrimination compels reversal and retrial regardless of 
any prima facie considerations. In short, both Batson and J.E.B. aimed to prohibit the 
type of superficial stereotyping that occurred here, and there is no justification for an 
9 
affirmance. 
B. The Prosecutor's Strike. Even if Used to Balance the Jury, was Sex-Based 
and Violated the Equal Protection Provision 
The State's second argument is that the prosecutor's strike was legal because he 
was not trying to remove men; he was trying to impanel a gender-balanced jury. 
Appellee's Br. 16-18. However, the record belies that argument. The prosecutor used one 
hundred percent of his strikes to remove men, R. 49, and admitted that he "made efforts 
to take men off the Jury." R. 101 [27]. He even admitted that he was more comfortable 
with women on the jury than men: "Mr. Romero was a man, I took him because he was a 
man and I thought I would be more comfortable with Ms. Rayburn or Ms. Tapp on the 
Jury than Mr. Romero on the Jury." Id. This evidence compels the conclusion that the 
prosecutor illegally discriminated against Mr. Romero on the basis of his sex. 
The State's argument not only blindsides the record, it reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of J.E.B. J.E.B. prohibits the prosecutor from using preemptive strikes 
to impanel a gender-balanced jury because doing so requires the prosecutor to focus 
exclusively on a venire person's sex, and then strike the venire person on that basis. That 
is unconstitutional. J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 130-31. It is also unwarranted. The J.E.B. Court 
recognized that perfect sexual and racial inter-dynamics will not be achieved for every 
jury, id at 133-34. Neither is it required under the Equal Protection clause. LI Equal 
Protection requires only that preemptive strikes not be race or gender-based. Id. at 143. 
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That is sufficient to protect the right of every person to participate in the justice process. 
Id. Using preemptive strikes to achieve gender-balance is, therefore, both unnecessary 
and unconstitutional.9 
The State is essentially asking this Court to make an inroad into J.E.B. on the basis 
that the prosecutor's purpose was higher than that of J.E.B. Appellee's Br. 17. But it is 
not the prosecutor's prerogative to violate the law for what he perceives as a higher 
purpose. Neither J.E.B. nor its jurisprudence contemplates exceptions based on higher 
purposes, or gives guidelines for evaluating such purposes. Opening the door for these 
exceptions violates J.E.B. and risks miring the simple holding of J.E.B. in a lot of cryptic 
nonsense that would soon nullify it. This is unacceptable. The J.E.B. Court declared that 
the highest purpose of the State in every case is to impanel a fair and impartial jury, and 
the prohibition against sex-based strikes inevitably furthers this purpose. J.E.B., 511 U.S. 
at 137 n.8. In simpler terms, striking venire persons on the basis of their sexes, for any 
9
 To further support its argument that the State struck men in order to achieve a gender-
balanced jury, and not for reasons of sexual discrimination, the State provides an outline 
showing that the prosecutor did not strike the first four males on the Jury List. Appellee's Br. 20-
21. Had the prosecutor wished to impanel a predominantly-female jury, the State argues, he 
would have dismissed the first four male jurors. Id. 
However, as already argued above, striking jurors to impanel a gender-balanced jury is 
not a legitimate goal under J.E.B. And, even if it was, the State is mistaken. Striking the first 
four eligible males would not have created a predominantly-female jury; it would have created a 
balanced jury of four men and four women. R. 49 (striking jurors 1, 2, 5, and 6 would have left 
juror 3, a female, juror 4, a female, juror 7, a male, juror 9, a male, juror 10, a female, juror 11, a 
male, juror 12, a male, and juror 13, a female). This, of course, does not take into account any 
strikes that would have been made by the defense counsel in such circumstances. These strikes 
cannot be shown because they cannot be predicted. This, however, is immaterial because 
achieving a gender-balanced jury is not a legitimate goal to begin with. 
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reason, is unconstitutional and there are no exceptions. 
The specific directive of J.E.B. is to find another basis, beyond sex or race, for 
exercising preemptive strikes. LI at 143-45. Lawyers should give at least minimal 
thought to the characteristics that they desire or do not desire in jurors and exercise their 
strikes accordingly.10 Strikes may be intelligently exercised, the J.E.B. Court pointed out, 
if voir dire is properly conducted: 
If conducted properly, voir dire can inform litigants about potential jurors, 
making reliance upon stereotypical and pejorative notions about a particular 
gender or race both unnecessary and unwise. Voir dire provides a means of 
discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the parties 
may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently. 
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143-44. The directive is simple. It requires nothing more of advocates 
than to look beyond race and gender in exercising strikes. In this case, the prosecutor did 
not do that. He applied illegal sex-based assumptions and stereotypes in striking Mr. 
Romero, and this violated the constitutional principal of Equal Protection. 
In conclusion, the trial court's failure to prohibit the strike against Mr. Romero is 
clearly erroneous and cannot be affirmed.11 The prosecutor used one hundred percent of 
10
 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143-44 (indicating that peremptory challenges may be exercised 
on the basis of anything other than race or gender); Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, f6 ("While a 
party is permitted to exercise their peremptory challenges for virtually any reason, or for no 
reason at al l . . . our case law is clear: 'parties in a criminal action may not discriminate against 
potential jurors by exercising peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race.'") (citation 
omitted); State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 401,404 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("In Purkett, the [United 
States Supreme] Court stated merely that '[w]hat it means by a 'legitimate reason' is not a 
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.') (citation omitted). 
11
 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137-38 (responding to the State's argument that striking "virtually 
all the males from the jury" was reasonable because men would likely be more sympathetic to 
the arguments of a man in a paternity case, the United States Supreme Court held, "[w]e shall 
12 
his strikes against men, R. 49, and he admitted that he removed Mr. Romero solely 
because he is a man. R. 101 [27]. He even admitted his "game plan" was to remove men 
and he was more comfortable with women on the jury. Id The record shows no other 
reason for Mr. Romero's dismissal, and nothing indicates that he was an incompetent or 
otherwise undesirable. Id at 7, 27. The trial court should have met the prosecutor's strike 
with a flat refusal. Instead, it brushed aside the holding of J.E.B. and ruled that the strike 
was permissible because this is a "spousal-abuse type of case." Id at 28. This cannot be 
allowed to stand, and must be corrected by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Chatwin's conviction should be reversed, and this case 
should be remanded for a new trial before a jury which is not tainted by unconstitutional 
race or gender discrimination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this iQU day of May, 2002. 
^ / ^ HEATHER JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
not accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law 
condemns.'") (citation omitted). 
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